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**Unique Keys for ATSHA204**

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## Features

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- Use of the Atmel® ATSHA204 unique serial number and a Root Key to create a Unique Key (Diversified Key)
- Configuring the ATSHA204 with Unique Keys
- Authenticating the Unique Key using a Host ATSHA204 containing the Root Key
- Description of the Diversified Key Calculator in ACES (Atmel Crypto Evaluation Studio)
- Demonstration of Host validation using the DeriveKey command
- Demonstration of Host validation using the GenDig command
- Pseudo Code for Host validation — for systems that do not have a Host ATSHA204

## Description

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A unique key can be created for each Client based on its serial number and a Root Key. This is referred to as key diversification. Since each Client device is programmed with a unique secret, the Diversified Key is of less value to an attacker.

This walkthrough will configure the ATSHA204 device with a Diversified Key based on cryptographically combining a Root Key with the ATSHA204 Serial Number which is guaranteed to be unique. After configuring the Diversified Key, this walkthrough will continue with a step by step to writing this Diversified Key to the Client device.


Once the Client is configured, an explanation of how a system can validate the configured key by performing a MAC on the Client Diversified then comparing the resulting digest to the digest generated by an equivalent cryptographic calculation using the Client Serial Number and the Root Key.

A demonstration of how the GenDig command or the DeriveKey command can be used by an ATSHA204 Host device to validate the ATSHA204 Client Diversified Key will also be summarized.

# 1. Diversified Key Description

As shown in Figure 1-1, the Host authenticates a Client Diversified Key using the Root Key that was used to calculate the Client Diversified Key. The Diversified Key calculation cryptographically combines the Client Serial Number with the Root Key that is stored on the Host. Since Diversified Keys are based on a Root Key, the Host only needs knowledge of the Client Serial Number to validate the Client Diversified Key.

Figure 1-1. Host Authenticates a Client Diversified Key Using the Root Key



Every Client has a Unique Key — Loss of One Does Not Compromise All

## 2. Walkthrough Steps

The steps in this section describe the process of configuring and authenticating diversified keys.

### 2.1 Device Configuration


For this walkthrough, start by setting up the Configuration zone within the ATSHA204 device. This configuration will act as both a Host and Client ATSHA204. This configuration uses a single device to demonstrate the concepts; in an actual system the Host device would be separate. [Table 2-1](#) gives both the description and configuration bytes for each slot used.

**Table 2-1. Slot Configurations**

Slot	Title	Description	Slot Configuration
00	Client Diversified Key	<b>Client Slot:</b> This slot will be diversified using the Serial Number and the Host Root Key.	Read – Is Secret Write – Never Bytes – 8F 8F
01	Host Target	<b>Host Slot:</b> This is the target slot defined for the DeriveKey command.	Read – Is Secret, CheckOnly Write – DeriveKey (parent 2) Bytes – 9F 32
02	Host Root Key	<b>Root used for key diversification:</b> Use the DeriveKey Command to verify the Client Diversified Key. This key is to be programmed on the Host ATSHA204.	Read – Is Secret Write – Never Bytes – 8F 8F
03	Host Root Key	<b>Root used for key diversification:</b> Use the GenDig Command to verify the Client Diversified Key. This key is to be programmed on the Host ATSHA204.	Read – Is Secret, CheckOnly Write – Never Bytes – 9F 8F

1. Launch ACES Configuration Environment (CE) with an *unlocked* ATSHA204 device (use an AT88CK101 or an AT88CK454 development kit).
2. Select **Configuration Zone** in the **Device Navigator** as shown in [Figure 2-1](#).


**Figure 2-1. Select Configuration Zone**



3. Click on the **SlotConfig00** memory location in the Memory map.


- The **Write Bytes** dialog box will be displayed as shown in [Figure 2-2](#).

Figure 2-2. Write Bytes Dialog Box — SlotConfig00



- Type the configuration for Slot 00 in the **SlotConfig00** field from [Table 2-1](#) (8F 8F).
  - Repeat for Slot 01 (9F 32).
  - Repeat for Slot 02 (8F 8F).
  - Repeat for Slot 03 (9F 8F).
- Lock the Configuration zone.
  - Select **Tools > Lock Zones** from the menu.
  - The **Lock Zone** dialog box will be displayed as shown in [Figure 2-3](#).
  - Select the **Lock Configuration Zone** check box and click on the **Lock Zones** button.
  - The **Lock Successful** message will be displayed.


Figure 2-3. Lock Zone Dialog Box






11. Select **Slot 00** in the **Device Navigator** as shown in [Figure 2-5](#).

**Figure 2-5. Slot 00 Showing Diversified Key Data**




12. Client Configuration — Write the calculated Diversified Key into Slot 00 of the ATSHA204.
  - Triple-click on the calculated Diversified Key data in the **Calculated Diversified Key** dialog box to select all the data.
  - Copy the data into the clipboard.
  - Click on any location in the Memory zone. The **Write Zone** dialog box will be displayed as shown in [Figure 2-6](#).
  - Paste the Diversified Key data into the **Data to Write** field.
  - Click on the **Write To Zone** button.
13. Host Configuration — Write Root Key into Slot 02 and Slot 03 of the ATSHA204. Follow these steps to write the Root Key (all three or unique key) that was used to generate the Diversified Key.
  - Click on any location in the Slot 02 Memory zone. The **Write Zone** dialog box will display as shown in [Figure 2-6](#).
  - Paste the Root Key data (all three or unique key) into the **Data to Write** field.
  - Click on the **Write To Zone** button.
  - Repeat these Write steps for Slot 03.

Figure 2-6. Write Zone Dialog Box — Write Slot 00



14. Lock the OTP and Data zones.
  - Select the **Tools > Lock Zones** menu.
  - The **Lock Zone** dialog box will be displayed as shown in [Figure 2-7](#).
  - Select the **Lock OTP and Data Zones** check box and click on the **Lock Zones** button.
  - The **Lock Successful** message will be displayed.

Figure 2-7. Diversified Key Calculation Dialog Box



## 2.2 Validating the Diversified Key

The Diversified Key has now been configured into the Client (Slot 00).

Note: The Diversified Key *uses* the Root Key in the cryptographic calculation that generated it — the Client does not need to *have* the RootKey programmed into it.

```
DiversifiedKey = SHA256(RootKey, SerialNumber, ...)
```

In addition to when the Host has knowledge of the RootKey, only the `SerialNumber` needs to be available to generate the `DiversifiedKey`. Since the `SerialNumber` can be read from each ATSHA204 Client, the Host can validate the Diversified Key in one of several different ways:

- Using the `DeriveKey` command on a ATSHA204 programmed with the Root Key (e.g. Slot 02).
- Using the `GenDig` command on a ATSHA204 programmed with the Root Key (e.g. Slot 03).
- Using the system code that has access to the Root Key. For most systems, this technique is *not* recommended.

Each of these validations of the Diversified Key will be demonstrated.

### 2.2.1 Validation Pseudo Code

The first validation technique that will be examined is the Pseudo Code Host. This technique is *not* recommended since most systems, the Root Key must be used in the clear and cannot be stored securely in firmware. This section is useful for secure microprocessors and to illustrate the calculations that are performed internally in the ATSHA204.

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#### Diversified Key Validation Pseudo Code — System Code with RootKey

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```
// Initialize the communication
sha204p_init();

// Set the Client device
sha204p_set_device_id(CLIENT_ID);

// Wake up the ATSHA204
sha204c_wakeup();

// Function Prototype: resultBuf = sha204m_execute(command, param1, param2,
data)

// Read the first 32 bytes from the config zone to get the Client Serial Number
snRead = sha204m_execute(SHA204_READ, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00);

// Parse the Client SerialNumber
serialNumber = snRead[0:3] + snRead[8:12];

// Generate a random number on the Host for the 32 byte challenge
randChal = sha204m_execute(SHA204_RANDOM, 0x00, 0x0000, null);

// Execute a MAC Command on the ATSHA204 & save the digest
param1Mac = 0x00;
param2Mac = [00, 00];
deviceDigest = sha204m_execute(SHA204_MAC, param1Mac, param2Mac, randChal);
```

```

// Calculate the Diversified Key using the DeriveKey calculation & a soft SHA-
256
rootKey = ... // 32 byte secret here
opCodeDk = 0x1C;
param1 = 0x04;
param2 = ... // 2 byte slot ID here (LSB byte order 0x0X 00)
sn8 = ... // 1 byte SN[8] here
sn01 = ... // 2 bytes SN[0:1] here
zeros = ... // 25 bytes of 0's here
snPad = ... // 23 bytes of pad here
divKey =
sha256(rootKey+opCode+param1+param2+sn8+sn01+zeros+serialNumber+snPad);

// Execute a MAC on the calculated Diversified Key
// using the calculation of ATSHA204 MAC Command & a soft SHA-256
opCodeMac = 0x08;
otpZeros = [00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00]; // 13 bytes of
zeros
sn23 = [00, 00]; // 2 bytes SN[2:3], use zeros
sn47 = [00, 00, 00, 00]; // 4 bytes SN[4:7], use zeros
macBytes =
divKey+randChal+opCodeMac+param1Mac+param2Mac+otpZeros+sn8+sn47+sn01+sn23;
softDigest = sha256(macBytes);

// Compare the resulting digests from the ATSHA204 & the soft MAC
match = deviceDigest == softDigest;


```

## 2.2.2 Read Client Serial Number and Execute the MAC Command

The next two methods involve using ACES with [Step 1.](#); read the SerialNumber and [Step 2.](#); execute the MAC Command on the Diversified Key slot.

1. Execute Read — Read the Serial Number
  - o Select the **Tools > Command Builder** menu.
  - o The **Command Builder** dialog box will be displayed as shown in [Figure 2-8](#).
  - o In the **OpCode** drop down list, select the **Read** command.
  - o Set the **Zone** to **80** (= 00 and 80) which indicates 32 byte read from the Configuration zone.
  - o Set the **Address** to **0000**.
  - o Click on the **Execute Command** button.
  - o The **Response Packet** field will contain the bytes that were read.
2. Isolate the SerialNumber.
  - o The nine byte serial number are bytes [0:3] and [8:12].
  - o For this example: 0123375205975AEEEE.

Figure 2-8. Read SerialNumber — Command Builder







2. Execute GenDig — Initialize TempKey with the Diversified Key.
  - Leave the **Command Builder** dialog box open.
  - In the **OpCode** drop down list, select the **GenDig** command.
  - Set the **MemZone** to **02** which indicates the Data zone.
  - Set the **KeyID** to **0300** (LSB). This is the Host slot configured for GenDig validation of the Diversified Key.
  - Set the **Data** to **1C040100**. This is **OtherData** for GenDig that makes the crypto calculation the same as DeriveKey.
  - Click on the **Execute Command** button.
  - The **Response Packet** field will contain **00**, indicating success.

Figure 2-11. GenDig — Command Builder

The screenshot shows the 'Command Builder' dialog box with the following configuration and details:

Command Packet	
OpCode:	GenDig
MemZone	02
KeyID	0300
Data:	1C040100

Send Count: 0B    Response Count: 04

Send Details	
Send Count:	0B
Send Packet:	15 02 03 00 1C 04 01 00
Send Checksum:	8C 6B

Response Details	
Response Count:	04
Response Packet:	00
Response Checksum:	03 40


**Execute Command**





2. Execute DeriveKey — Write the Client Diversified Key into a Slot on the Host.
  - In the **OpCode** drop down list, select the **DeriveKey** command.
  - Set the **Random** to **04**. This matches the TempKey source flag of pass-through mode.
  - Set the **TargetKey** to **0100** (LSB). This Host slot is configured for a DeriveKey target.
  - Click on the **Execute Command** button.
  - The **Response Packet** field will contain **00**, indicating success.

Figure 2-14. DeriveKey — Command Builder







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